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A Simple Robust Link Between American Puts and Credit Protection

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  • Peter Carr
  • Liuren Wu

Abstract

We develop a simple robust link between deep out-of-the-money American put options on a company's stock and a credit insurance contract on the company's bond. We assume that the stock price stays above a barrier B before default but drops below a lower barrier A after default, thus generating a default corridor [A,B] that the stock price can never enter. Given the presence of this default corridor, a spread between two co-terminal American put options struck within the corridor replicates a pure credit contract, paying off when and only when default occurs prior to the option expiry. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Carr & Liuren Wu, 2011. "A Simple Robust Link Between American Puts and Credit Protection," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(2), pages 473-505.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:24:y:2011:i:2:p:473-505
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vidal Nunes, João Pedro & Ruas, João Pedro & Dias, José Carlos, 2015. "Pricing and static hedging of American-style knock-in options on defaultable stocks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 343-360.
    2. Da Fonseca, José & Gottschalk, Katrin, 2014. "Cross-hedging strategies between CDS spreads and option volatility during crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(PB), pages 386-400.
    3. Christopher L. Culp & Yoshio Nozawa & Pietro Veronesi, 2014. "Option-Based Credit Spreads," NBER Working Papers 20776, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Schneider, Paul & Wagner, Christian & Zechner, Josef, 2016. "Low risk anomalies?," CFS Working Paper Series 550, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    5. Agostino Capponi & Stefano Pagliarani & Tiziano Vargiolu, 2014. "Pricing vulnerable claims in a Lévy-driven model," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 755-789, October.
    6. Peter Christoffersen & Du Du & Redouane Elkamhi, 2013. "Rare Disasters and Credit Market Puzzles," CREATES Research Papers 2013-45, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    7. Da Fonseca, José & Ignatieva, Katja & Ziveyi, Jonathan, 2016. "Explaining credit default swap spreads by means of realized jumps and volatilities in the energy market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 215-228.
    8. Peter J. Zeitsch, 2017. "Capital Structure Arbitrage under a Risk-Neutral Calibration," Journal of Risk and Financial Management, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 10(1), pages 1-23, January.
    9. Bo Young Chang & Greg Orosi, 2016. "Equity Option-Implied Probability of Default and Equity Recovery Rate," Staff Working Papers 16-58, Bank of Canada.
    10. Culp, Christopher L. & Nozawa, Yoshio & Veronesi, Pietro, 2014. "Option-Based Credit Spreads," CEPR Discussion Papers 10318, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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