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Market Discipline and Internal Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry


  • Thomas Dangl
  • Youchang Wu
  • Josef Zechner


We develop a continuous-time model in which a portfolio manager is hired by a management company. On the basis of observed portfolio returns, all agents update their beliefs about the manager's skills. In response, investors can move capital into or out of the mutual fund, and the management company can fire the manager. Introducing firing rationalizes several empirically documented findings, such as the positive relation between manager tenure and fund size or the increase of portfolio risk before a manager replacement and the following risk decrease. The analysis predicts that the critical performance threshold that triggers firing increases significantly over a manager's tenure and that management replacements are accompanied by capital inflows when a young manager is replaced but may be accompanied by capital outflows when a manager with a long tenure is fired. Our model yields much lower valuation levels for management companies than simple applications of discounted cash flow (DCF) methods and is thus more consistent with empirical observations. , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Dangl & Youchang Wu & Josef Zechner, 2008. "Market Discipline and Internal Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(5), pages 2307-2343, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:21:y:2008:i:5:p:2307-2343

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    Cited by:

    1. Ľuboš Pástor & Robert F. Stambaugh, 2012. "On the Size of the Active Management Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(4), pages 740-781.
    2. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2014. "Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 607-627.
    3. Qian, Meijun, 2011. "Is "voting with your feet" an effective mutual fund governance mechanism?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 45-61, February.
    4. Lubos Pastor & Pietro Veronesi, 2009. "Learning in Financial Markets," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 361-381, November.
    5. Taylor, Lucian A., 2013. "CEO wage dynamics: Estimates from a learning model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 79-98.
    6. Wu, Youchang & Wermers, Russ & Zechner, Josef, 2012. "Governance and shareholder value in delegated portfolio management: The case of closed-end funds," CFR Working Papers 12-11, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    7. Ber, Silke & Kempf, Alexander & Ruenzi, Stefan, 2005. "Determinanten der Mittelzuflüsse bei deutschen Aktienfonds," CFR Working Papers 05-11, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    8. Bredin, Don & Cuthbertson, Keith & Nitzsche, Dirk & Thomas, Dylan C., 2014. "Performance and performance persistence of UK closed-end equity funds," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 189-199.
    9. Ping Hu & Jayant R. Kale & Marco Pagani & Ajay Subramanian, 2011. "Fund Flows, Performance, Managerial Career Concerns, and Risk Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 628-646, April.
    10. Casavecchia, Lorenzo, 2016. "Fund managers' herding and the sensitivity of fund flows to past performance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 205-221.
    11. Bessler, Wolfgang & Blake, David & Lückoff, Peter & Tonks, Ian, 2010. "Why does mutual fund performance not persist? The impact and interaction of fund flows and manager changes," MPRA Paper 34185, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Clare, Andrew & Motson, Nick & Sapuric, Svetlana & Todorovic, Natasa, 2014. "What impact does a change of fund manager have on mutual fund performance?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 167-177.
    13. Veasna Khim & Hery Razafitombo, 2015. "The Impact of UCITS IV Directive on European Mutual Funds Performance," Post-Print hal-01698550, HAL.
    14. Cuthbertson, Keith & Nitzsche, Dirk, 2013. "Performance, stock selection and market timing of the German equity mutual fund industry," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 86-101.
    15. repec:kap:fmktpm:v:31:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11408-017-0287-y is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Wu, Youchang & Wermers, Russ & Zechner, Josef, 2016. "Managerial rents vs. shareholder value in delegated portfolio management: The case of closed-end funds," CFS Working Paper Series 548, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).

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