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Welfare Effects of Dynamic Matching: An Empirical Analysis
[The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match]

Author

Listed:
  • Valentin Verdier
  • Carson Reeling

Abstract

Allocating resources without monetary payments is expected to yield inefficient allocations. Theory suggests that introducing rationing when resources are allocated repeatedly over time can mitigate this issue, while the magnitude of the resulting efficiency gains is an empirical question in most settings. We study a dynamic assignment mechanism used by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources to allocate bear hunting licenses and find that it yields a more efficient allocation than static mechanisms, allocating participants to types of resources for which they have a higher value without crowding out participants with a high overall value for hunting. Our empirical analysis also highlights the importance of heterogeneity across participants and across allocated resources for determining the efficiency of a dynamic allocation mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Valentin Verdier & Carson Reeling, 2022. "Welfare Effects of Dynamic Matching: An Empirical Analysis [The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(2), pages 1008-1037.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:89:y:2022:i:2:p:1008-1037.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdab048
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    Cited by:

    1. David Scrogin, 2023. "Estimating risk and time preferences over public lotteries: Findings from the field and stream," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 73-106, August.

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