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Investor Rewards to Climate Responsibility: Stock-Price Responses to the Opposite Shocks of the 2016 and 2020 U.S. Elections
[Asset pricing with liquidity risk]

Author

Listed:
  • Stefano Ramelli
  • Alexander F Wagner
  • Richard J Zeckhauser
  • Alexandre Ziegler

Abstract

Donald Trump’s 2016 election and his nomination of climate skeptic Scott Pruitt to head the Environmental Protection Agency drastically downshifted expectations about U.S. policy toward climate change. Joseph Biden’s 2020 election shifted them dramatically upward. We study firms’ stock-price movements in reaction to these changes. As expected, the 2016 election boosted carbon-intensive firms. Surprisingly, firms with climate-responsible strategies also gained, especially those firms held by long-run investors. Such investors appear to have bet on a “boomerang” in climate policy. Harbingers of a boomerang appeared during Trump’s term. The 2020 election marked its arrival. (JEL G14, G38, G41)

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Ramelli & Alexander F Wagner & Richard J Zeckhauser & Alexandre Ziegler, 2021. "Investor Rewards to Climate Responsibility: Stock-Price Responses to the Opposite Shocks of the 2016 and 2020 U.S. Elections [Asset pricing with liquidity risk]," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(4), pages 748-787.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rcorpf:v:10:y:2021:i:4:p:748-787.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rcfs/cfab010
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    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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