Nondissipative Signaling Structures and Dividend Policy
Existence conditions for signaling equilibria in which the signal is not exogenously costly are derived for the continuum of classes case. Applications to labor market models based on productivity quotas and time-profiles of wages, and an exploratory model of the "information content" of corporate dividends are discussed. The last application focuses on intertemporal consistency requirements and the role of insider trading observations.
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Volume (Year): 95 (1980)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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