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On the Observational Equivalence of Managerial Contracts Under Conditions of Moral Hazard and Self-Selection

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  • Kathleen M. Hagerty
  • Daniel R. Siegel

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  • Kathleen M. Hagerty & Daniel R. Siegel, 1988. "On the Observational Equivalence of Managerial Contracts Under Conditions of Moral Hazard and Self-Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(2), pages 425-428.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:103:y:1988:i:2:p:425-428.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1885123
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    Cited by:

    1. Ittner, Christopher D. & Lambert, Richard A. & Larcker, David F., 2003. "The structure and performance consequences of equity grants to employees of new economy firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 89-127, January.
    2. Jacques LAWARREE, 1990. "Incitations Manageriales Dans Les Entreprises Publiques," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 469-488, October.
    3. Joyce Berg & Don Coursey & John Dickhaut, 1990. "Experimental methods in accounting: A discussion of recurring issues," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 825-849, March.
    4. Christopher S. Armstrong & David F. Larcker & Che-Lin Su, 2010. "Endogenous Selection and Moral Hazard in Compensation Contracts," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(4-part-2), pages 1090-1106, August.
    5. Davide Vannoni, 2000. "The diversifield firm: non formal theories versus formal models," ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2000(106).
    6. Mark Jansen, 2020. "Resolving Information Asymmetry Through Contractual Risk Sharing: The Case of Private Firm Acquisitions," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(5), pages 1203-1248, December.
    7. Christopher Armstrong & David Larcker & Che-Lin Su, 2007. "Stock Options and Chief Executive Compensation," Discussion Papers 1447, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Deepak Hegde, 2014. "Tacit Knowledge and the Structure of License Contracts: Evidence from the Biomedical Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 568-600, September.

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