Can Federalism Protect Subnational Liberal Democracy from Central Authoritarianism?

Liberal democracy is eroding rapidly around the globe, including in the United States, raising alarming questions about whether American democratic institutions will endure. Nevertheless, some have speculated that federalism may protect liberal democracy at the subnational level when the central government turns authoritarian. This article argues that such optimism is premature: there is no a priori basis on which to predict the effect of central democratic backsliding on the quality of subnational democracy. Federal theory does suggest that internal heterogeneity in basic political commitments is likely to produce an escalating pattern of severe and possibly intractable intergovernmental conflict. Empirical evidence bears this out: while subnational governments often resist nationally authoritarian policies, authoritarian central governments tend to punish and suppress this resistance. Nevertheless, although successful subnational resistance in particular cases cannot be ruled out, the most likely outcome of central democratic backsliding appears to be some kind of competitive authoritarianism regardless of whether the state is federal or unitary. Thus, federalism may offer little meaningful protection against long-term democratic backsliding. Additional research is needed to reach firmer conclusions.