Exploring the Relationship between Federal Reform and the Representation of the People: The Case of the Belgian House of Representatives

Federal systems tend to have two venues of representation to ensure that both the people as a whole and the constituent units are represented at the federal level. While this double representation is put forward as a basic (normative) feature of federal systems, little to no empirical research has been conducted on this issue. This contribution therefore studies the representation of the people as a whole and of the constituent units in the Belgian House of Representatives by means of a representative claims analysis of 4,757 oral parliamentary questions. As federal systems tend to be dynamic, the analysis is based on six periods of federal reform through which Belgium decentralized. Our findings show that, over time, the representation of the constituent units increased and exceeded the representation of the people, providing unique empirical input for the debate about the idea that federalism is by definition beneficial for democracy. We problematize our results from a democratic point of view, as—despite being able to vote—the people as a whole are hardly any more represented by the House. Going beyond the Belgian case, we argue that processes of federalization should address the adequate representation of both the constituent units and the people.