Connecting Minorities to the Swiss Federal System: A Frozen Conception of Representation and the Problem of “Requisite Variety”

Heterogeneous Switzerland is often portrayed as a model of successful nation-building. Two major institutions ensure the representation of federal units within the federal political system: the Council of States branch of the bicameral legislature, and the “double majority” of popular and cantonal votes needed in constitutional referenda. It was expected that both mechanisms would counter centrifugal forces possibly created by the self-government of subnational groups. Historical analysis shows, however, that since these institutions were established, some important social transformations have occurred, with perverse effects on minority representation and on cleavage accommodation. The Council of States has come to amplify the influence of established political forces, instead of defending minority influence. The “double majority” now gives excessive veto power to minorities no longer socially relevant, at the expense of newer, more needy groups. National cohesion and consensus democracy, in short, risk being eroded rather than strengthened by these core institutions of the Swiss federal system. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.