Analogous Wrongs: Privacy Invasions and Discrimination

Privacy scholars and activists frequently argue that one reason for protecting privacy is the danger that personal information could be used for discriminatory purposes. This proposition raises two questions: practically, are privacy rights capable of pre-empting discriminatory treatment; and, if so, is preventing discrimination conceptually part of, or related to, the purpose of privacy rights? This article provides answers in two parts. The first part partially vindicates the hope that privacy can, under certain conditions, guard against discriminatory treatment. However, I also explain that relying on privacy as proto-anti-discrimination law risks conferring added burdens to those already at risk of discrimination. The second part maps out ontological connections between the wrongs of privacy invasions and discriminatory treatment. I explain that direct discrimination is disadvantageous treatment on the basis of a particular kind of illicit reason or ‘ground’ that relates to protected group characteristics, like race or gender. I then propose an analogous view of privacy violations as doxastic states (eg states of knowledge) about others that are wrongful in virtue of relying on illicit reasons for belief.