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Do We Really Want an Independent Central Bank?

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  • Doyle, Christopher
  • Weale, Martin

Abstract

The issue of an independent central bank is assessed in the context of experience in the U.K. economy. The historical role of the Bank of England is examined, revealing that the success of anti-inflation policy depends on the exchange-rate regime as well as on the institutional arrangements holding between the Bank and government. Inflation targets are discussed but independence is also addressed by seeing how other targets, such as nominal GDP, might perform. The theoretical arguments for and against an independent central bank are discussed in detail. It is argued that "partial" independence, where the central bank enjoys autonomy in relatively good states and is overridden in bad states, is the preferred form of independence. Attention is drawn to the costs arising owing to a lack of coordination of policy when the finance ministry may compete against the central bank in the case where the latter is independent. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Doyle, Christopher & Weale, Martin, 1994. "Do We Really Want an Independent Central Bank?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 10(3), pages 61-77, Autumn.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:10:y:1994:i:3:p:61-77
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    Cited by:

    1. Nuran Gokbudak, 1996. "Central Bank Independence, the Bundesbank Experience and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey," Discussion Papers 9610, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
    2. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jakob de Haan, 1997. "A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank," CESifo Working Paper Series 131, CESifo.

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