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It’s me again… Ask avoidance and the dynamics of charitable giving

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  • Maximilian Späth

Abstract

Charities typically ask potential donors repeatedly for a donation. These repeated requests might trigger avoidance behaviour. Considering that, this article analyses the impact of offering the option to opt-out of receiving future fundraising asks on charitable giving. In a proposed utility framework, any opt-out option decreases the social pressure to donate. At the same time, an unconditional opt-out option induces feelings of gratitude toward the fundraiser, which may lead to a reciprocal increase in donations. The results of a lab experiment designed to disentangle the two channels show no negative impact of the option to avoid repeated asking for donations. Instead, the full model indicates a positive impact of the reciprocity channel. This finding suggests that it might be beneficial for charities to introduce an unconditional opt-out option during high-frequency fundraising campaigns.

Suggested Citation

  • Maximilian Späth, 2023. "It’s me again… Ask avoidance and the dynamics of charitable giving," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 962-972.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:75:y:2023:i:4:p:962-972.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpad020
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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