The Open Shop Union, Wages, and Management Opposition
This paper develops a model of union-firm bargaining in which union membership is determined with the wage through the impact of management opposition to unionization. Empirical evidence, both for the United States and the United Kingdom, suggests that management opposition to unions is an important determinant of union membership necessary for the union to be able to obtain a wage mark-up and the authors analyze how this critical level varies with the parameters of the model, such as the competitive wage and the firm's product market conditions. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.
Volume (Year): 45 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:45:y:1993:i:4:p:589-604. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.