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Liability for non-disclosure in IPOs

Author

Listed:
  • Albert H Choi
  • Kathryn E Spier

Abstract

A privately-informed entrepreneur may withhold material information from prospective investors who may sue the firm ex post for (alleged) non-disclosure. Absent liability, the entrepreneur has an excessive incentive to withhold bad news and pursue socially-wasteful projects. Liability deters inefficient non-disclosure and prevents capital misallocation. Any damage award received by investors is partially offset by a reduction in equity value. Depending on the likelihood of court error and litigation cost, the socially-optimal damage award may be either zero or the minimum necessary for full deterrence. The private incentive to waive liability may be socially excessive or insufficient. Positive and normative implications are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Albert H Choi & Kathryn E Spier, 2026. "Liability for non-disclosure in IPOs," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 281-318.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:42:y:2026:i:1:p:281-318.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewae029
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