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Pollution for promotion

Author

Listed:
  • Ruixue Jia

Abstract

This article provides evidence on the impact of political incentives on the environment using the case of China’s pollution during 1993–2010. Exploring variation in governors’ connections with key officials in the center, I document that gaining connections increases pollution (measured by satellite and official data). I also find that connected governors increase coal-fired power production more when less precipitation makes it more difficult to rely on hydropower. These results highlight the importance that career incentives play in influencing environmental outcomes, and they propose a potential pathway for mitigating environmental challenges through the recalibration of political incentives. (JEL D74, H11, Q53).

Suggested Citation

  • Ruixue Jia, 2025. "Pollution for promotion," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 866-892.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:41:y:2025:i:3:p:866-892.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewae025
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Chang & Wang, Huanhuan & Xue, Chang, 2026. "Rulers’ agents: Localism of law enforcement leaders and the patterns of trade," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    2. Li, Yidong & Jiang, Weijie, 2026. "Environmental decentralization and firm pollution: Evidence from China’s environmental impact assessment reform," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    3. Wang, Yaxin & Wang, Siyu & Li, Yan, 2026. "Government myopia and corporate environmental investment: Evidence from urban policy text analysis," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    4. Wang, Meng & Zhao, Xiaoqing, 2026. "Promotion incentives and participatory governance in China: Evidence from TV policy inquiry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    5. Cao, Guangyu & Weng, Xi & Xu, Mingwei & Zhou, Li-An, 2026. "How do bureaucrats respond to hybrid incentive contract? Evidence from China’s air pollution controls," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 259(C).
    6. Long, Xianling & Ji, Xi & Wu, Guowei & Zong, Xiaoxue & Su, Pinyi & Luo, Xuanyuan, 2026. "Does interagency power consolidation lead to better governance?," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 314-325.
    7. Lin, Xin & Liu, Fangrui & Zhang, Peng & Zheng, Shilin, 2026. "Can we balance green and growth? The environmental effect of place-based policies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 246(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling

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