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Color Blind Is Not Color Neutral: Testing Differences and Affirmative Action

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  • Benoit, Jean-Pierre

Abstract

Employers or universities determine the qualifications of applicants based on the results of a test. Members of socioeconomically disadvantaged groups tend to score less well than equally qualified members of other groups. As a result, color blind practices discriminate against disadvantaged groups. This discrimination may persist even if rational firms realize that the test is (statistically) biased. Furthermore, test bias against a group is consistent with the test overpredicting group members' performance. An affirmative action program may be needed to achieve color-neutral results. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 1999. "Color Blind Is Not Color Neutral: Testing Differences and Affirmative Action," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 378-400, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:2:p:378-400
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:dun:dpaper:88 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Gregory Price, 2008. "NEA Presidential Address: Black Economists of the World You Cite!!," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 1-12, March.
    3. Ajit Mishra, 1998. "A Theory Of Discrimination Based On Signalling And Strategic Information Acquisition," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 088, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.

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