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International Economic Law, 'Public Reason', and Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods


  • Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann


Is ineffective protection of international public goods, and thereby also of interrelated national public goods, the inevitable fate of humanity? The negative answer to this question in Section II argues that ineffective protection of public goods is mainly due to a lack of adequate theories, rules, and institutions for overcoming the collective action problems in multilevel governance of interdependent public goods. Section III reviews the competing conceptions of 'international economic law' (IEL) such as public international law approaches, multilevel economic law approaches, 'global administrative law' (GAL) approaches, 'conflicts law approaches', and 'multilevel constitutional approaches'. Section IV argues that--similar to the experience that 'national public goods' can be supplied democratically only in a framework of constitutional, legislative, administrative, and judicial rules and procedures supported by domestic citizens--multilevel governance of 'international public goods' requires a multilevel constitutional framework for multilevel rule-making and judicial protection of rule of law and constitutional rights supported by domestic citizens as 'primary' legal subjects of IEL. Section V concludes that multilevel governance of interdependent public goods must no longer be designed only as 'foreign policy', but also as part of 'multilevel constitutionalism' necessary for protecting common, reasonable self-interests of all citizens and states. Oxford University Press 2011, all rights reserved, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 2011. "International Economic Law, 'Public Reason', and Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 23-76, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:14:y:2011:i:1:p:23-76

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