IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jeurec/v23y2025i5p1635-1668..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Values as Luxury Goods and Political Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Benjamin Enke
  • Mattias K Polborn
  • Alex A Wu

Abstract

Motivated by novel survey evidence, we develop a theory of political behavior in which the relative weight voters place on values rather than material considerations increases in income. The model unifies several stylized facts about US politics and makes new predictions. The luxury goods idea implies—and two datasets confirm—that rich moral liberals are considerably more likely to vote against their economic interests than poor moral conservatives, cautioning against the common narrative that the working class is particularly politically motivated by values. For sufficiently morally liberal voters, increased income can even reduce the likelihood of voting for Republicans. Rich liberals’ and poor conservatives’ asymmetric priorities also explain why Democrats are internally more heterogeneous than Republicans, and why income and voting Republican are positively correlated across voters but negatively across states. Finally, we interpret the secular partisan realignment of rich moral liberals and poor moral conservatives through our model.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Enke & Mattias K Polborn & Alex A Wu, 2025. "Values as Luxury Goods and Political Behavior," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 23(5), pages 1635-1668.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:23:y:2025:i:5:p:1635-1668.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jeea/jvaf014
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:23:y:2025:i:5:p:1635-1668.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jeea .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.