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The Deterrent And Enunciating Effects Of Consent Decrees

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  • Giovanna Massarotto

Abstract

More than 90 percent of U.S. civil antitrust cases settle by consent decrees. This phenomenon raises two questions. First, do consent decrees sacrifice antitrust deterrence, given that no finding of liability is made and no fine imposed? Second, do consent decrees sacrifice the public good of adjudication to say what the law is? A comparison of the Intel investigations in Europe and the United States shows that consent decrees need not sacrifice deterrence. However, the current European approach to consent decrees, unlike the U.S. approach, does sacrifice the benefit of having courts explain the content of competition law.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanna Massarotto, 2015. "The Deterrent And Enunciating Effects Of Consent Decrees," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 493-499.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:11:y:2015:i:2:p:493-499.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhv008
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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