The Structure of Problem-Solving Knowledge and the Structure of Organizations
This work presents a rather general model of organizational problem-solving able to account for the relationships between problem complexity, decentralization of tasks and problem-solving efficiency. Whenever problem-solving requires the coordination of a multiplicity of interdependent elements, the varying degrees of decentralization of cognitive and operational tasks shape the solutions which can be generated, tested and selected. Suboptimality and path-dependence are shown to be ubiquitous features of organizational problem-solving. At the same time, the model allows a precise exploration of the possible trade-offs between decomposition patterns and search efficiency involved in different organizational architectures. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 9 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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