Common Carriers, Public Utilities and Competition
What are the implications of the introduction of competition for public utility companies and regulators? To date, research has been restricted to stranded investment and the pricing of access for competitors. This paper examines how the public policy obligations traditionally placed on public utilities must change as competition is introduced, discussing the extent to which former public utility firms need to retain obligations after competition. Since the public utility concept has been tied closely to the common law concept of common carriage, the paper also examines common carriage rules as an alternative to public utility rules in competitive markets. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 5 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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