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How government intervention and supply chain competition and cooperation affect power battery recycling from a game theory perspective?

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  • KaiLiu

Abstract

In this paper, I delve into two supply chains, each composed of one battery supplier and one new energy vehicle manufacturer. Considering government intervention, competition, and cooperation, I analyze six scenarios. It is found that vertical/horizontal cooperation benefits the power battery-recycling rate, while the deposit-subsidy policy has limited impact, so the government should raise the subsidy. When some firms cooperate while others do not, it benefits the cooperators and harms non-cooperators. Scenario C maximizes the supply chain’s overall profit, yet Scenarios CC or TC are not always best for firm profitability. Notably, social welfare peaks in Scenario TC.

Suggested Citation

  • KaiLiu, 2025. "How government intervention and supply chain competition and cooperation affect power battery recycling from a game theory perspective?," International Journal of Low-Carbon Technologies, Oxford University Press, vol. 20, pages 1121-1135.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ijlctc:v:20:y:2025:i::p:1121-1135.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ijlct/ctaf059
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