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Taste-Based Gender Favouritism in High-Stake Decisions: Evidence from The Price is Right

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  • Pavel Atanasov
  • Jason D Dana
  • Bouke Klein

Abstract

Gender discrimination is present across various fields, but identifying the underlying mechanism is challenging. We demonstrate own-gender favouritism in a field setting that allows for clean identification of tastes versus beliefs: the One Bid game on the TV show The Price Is Right. Players must guess an item’s value without exceeding it, leaving the last bidder with a dominant ‘cutoff’ strategy of overbidding another player by 1. We show that last bidders are significantly more likely to cut off opposite-gender opponents. This behaviour is explained by own-gender favouritism rather than beliefs that cutting off opposite-gender opponents is more profitable.

Suggested Citation

  • Pavel Atanasov & Jason D Dana & Bouke Klein, 2024. "Taste-Based Gender Favouritism in High-Stake Decisions: Evidence from The Price is Right," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(658), pages 856-883.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:134:y:2024:i:658:p:856-883.
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