Longevity and Public Old-Age Pensions
Using an overlapping generations model with endogenous but uncertain longevity, this article analyzes the effects of public old-age pensions on longevity choice and capital accumulation. When agents are not altruistic, increases in old-age pensions are longevity-neutral for golden rule economies and longevity-decreasing if interest rates exceed population growth, and saving effects are strictly negative. When agents are altruistic, longevity is independent of old-age pensions regardless of the interest rate--population growth relation. On the other hand, the longevity effect of a price subsidy on longevity extending expenditures or an advance in longevity extending technology is positive.(JEL H5, J1) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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