IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v43y2005i1p13-23.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are Autocratic Rulers Also Inside Traders? Cross-Country Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • E. Woodrow Eckard

Abstract

Autocratic rulers can use economic regulation under their control to affect individual stock prices and then profit through insider trading. They are therefore less likely to have or enforce insider trading regulation. A cross-sectional analysis of 101 countries with stock markets supports the hypothesis. The probability of observing an enforced insider trading law is much lower in autocracies than in other countries. (JEL D73, G28, L51) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • E. Woodrow Eckard, 2005. "Are Autocratic Rulers Also Inside Traders? Cross-Country Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(1), pages 13-23, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:1:p:13-23
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbi002
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wong, Wing-Keung & Du, Jun & Chong, Terence Tai-Leung, 2005. "Do the technical indicators reward chartists? A study on the stock markets of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan," Review of Applied Economics, Review of Applied Economics, vol. 1(2).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:1:p:13-23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.