The Intersection of Business, State Government, and Special Interests in Federal Legislation: An Examination of Congressional Votes on the Road to Interstate Branching
The approval of interstate branching in 1994 created a significant structural change in the banking industry. The influences captured by 1991 congressional votes resulting in a red light for interstate branching are examined using public choice variables, state banking law variables, and variables characterizing the business of banking by states. Our research offers a methodology for modeling voting behavior in the presences of intra-industry conflicts and state versus federal government differences. We find that state and industry interests appear to influence votes more than political variables. (JEL G28, D72, L51) Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 41 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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