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Physician Market Power--Evidence from the Allocation of Malpractice Premiums

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  • Thurston, Norman K

Abstract

Based on evidence from variations in malpractice premiums, physicians have local market power, at least in some dimensions. It is observed that higher-cost physicians pass on a significant portion of idiosyncratic costs to patients as higher prices. I test two hypothesized sources of this market power: barriers to entry from specialization and relatively inelastic firm-level demand for certain services. Examining the relationship of physician-specific malpractice premiums to fees, I find no observable difference in the ability of surgeons and nonsurgeons to pass on these costs; however, both types of physicians pass them on more to surgical than to nonsurgical patients. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Thurston, Norman K, 2001. "Physician Market Power--Evidence from the Allocation of Malpractice Premiums," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(3), pages 487-498, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:39:y:2001:i:3:p:487-98
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    Cited by:

    1. Ronen Avraham & Leemore S. Dafny & Max M. Schanzenbach, 2009. "The Impact of Tort Reform on Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums," NBER Working Papers 15371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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