Voting and Imitative Behavior
Political behavior generates private benefits by helping people fit in with desired friends. A voter imitates other voters but at the same time they imitate him. An equilibrium solution requires exogenous variables: the narrow self-interest of the participants. The reduced form makes one's vote a function of the narrow self-interest of others as well as one's own. In accord with the model, a person's party identification depends on his ethnic group's current income and its income in 1909 as well as his own income. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 32 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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