Firm Specific Training, Layoffs, and Unreliable Workers
This paper determines the optimal level of firm-specific training and the optimal level of layoffs when some workers are unreliable in that they may receive and accept offers from outside the firm; more specifically, the paper determines the evolution of firm-specific training and layoffs as a worker acquires a reputation for reliability with his employer. The paper shows, for example, that layoffs may be higher or lower than the level implied by the condition that a worker's value of leisure equal the value of his contribution to output. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 29 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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