Feminist and post-Keynesian economics: challenges and opportunities
There are significant areas of difference between feminist and post-Keynesian economics. Some feminist contributions to discussions about ontology and critical realism suggest strong reluctance to adopt realist philosophies and these provide a marked contrast with post-Keynesians' frequent appeals for economics to reflect 'reality'. At the same time, however, some post-Keynesians are calling for a more inclusive, pluralist approach to economic research, a discussion that has areas of commonality with various feminist discussions of epistemology. Continued productive dialogue between the two traditions may be facilitated through an understanding of their contrasting ontological and epistemological debates. It may be further accommodated by growing recognition of the potential advantages of utilising plural methods to address specific research questions. Copyright The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved., Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
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