Bargaining power, effective demand and technical progress: a Kaleckian model of growth
Following the Kaleckian tradition, this paper presents a demand-led growth model in which the distribution of income is fully endogenised. This is done by introducing claims on income by workers and firms. The bargaining power of these two groups affects, through distribution, the patterns of accumulation and inflation. In turn, the bargaining power of workers is affected by the rate of change of employment. The paper discusses the model's static and dynamic implications, including the effects of exogenous and induced technical progress. The model confirms all the typical Kaleckian results, including the fact that increases in real wages may lead to accelerating accumulation as well as inflation. It also produces a new result: it is possible that an increase in the rate of change of labour productivity may not lead to an increase in the rate of change of employment. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 27 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://www.cje.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:27:y:2003:i:3:p:449-464. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.