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Price Regulation in Hungary, 1968-87: A Behavioural-Institutional Explanation

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  • Swaan, Wim

Abstract

Although the official goals with regard to price formation have become increasingly market-oriented in Hungary, the price system itself has retained a bureaucratic character. After the transfer of tasks from the branch ministries, the behavior of the Price Office is characterized by a mixture of branch-defending indulgence and unhesitating strictness. The capture theory of regulation may provide some explanation, but not a complete one. Comprehensive bureaucratic control is reinforced at least as much by other factors: it goes with a soft budget constraint and requires a monopolistic market structure, which in turn increase the need for intervention. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Swaan, Wim, 1990. "Price Regulation in Hungary, 1968-87: A Behavioural-Institutional Explanation," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 14(3), pages 247-265, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:14:y:1990:i:3:p:247-65
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