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Optimal Trust Design in Mass Tort Bankruptcy

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  • Kenneth Ayotte
  • Yair Listokin

Abstract

Many firms have filed for bankruptcy to manage mass tort liabilities, most notably asbestos producers. We model a bankruptcy procedure that optimally balances the liquidity needs of present claimants and an uncertain number of future claimants. We find that future claimants should receive greater awards in expectation than present claimants as compensation for bearing greater future claims risk. We also find that allocating more value to contractual creditors in bankruptcy makes an earlier filing more likely, which may increase overall welfare. Optimal risk-sharing implies that creditors should receive equity in a trust fund, with tort claimants receiving senior debtlike securities. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth Ayotte & Yair Listokin, 2005. "Optimal Trust Design in Mass Tort Bankruptcy," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 7(2), pages 403-438.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:7:y:2005:i:2:p:403-438
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/ahi012
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