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Regional Growth and Policies in the European Union: Does the Common Agricultural Policy Have a Counter-Treatment Effect?

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  • Roberto Esposti

Abstract

This article investigates the impact of both the Common Agricultural Policy and structural policies on European regions by estimating a conditional growth convergence model. The Common Agricultural Policy influences the convergence process by affecting regional aggregate productivity, eventually conflicting with the structural policies designed to promote growth in lagging regions. The conditional convergence model is specified in a dynamic panel data form and applied to 206 regions observed from 1989 to 2000. A GMM estimation is applied in order to obtain consistent estimates of both the convergence parameter β and the impact of the conditioning variables, policy measures in particular. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

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  • Roberto Esposti, 2007. "Regional Growth and Policies in the European Union: Does the Common Agricultural Policy Have a Counter-Treatment Effect?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(1), pages 116-134.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:89:y:2007:i:1:p:116-134
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.00967.x
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    1. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
    3. William Hallagan, 1978. "Self-Selection by Contractual Choice and the Theory of Sharecropping," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 344-354, Autumn.
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