IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Federalism, Opportunism, and Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Agriculture


  • Fred J. Ruppel
  • Fred O. Boadu
  • E. Wesley F. Peterson


When federalist nations are signatories to international economic agreements, potential problems arise because of the inherent conflicts between federal law and legitimate state interests. This paper presents a conceptual framework for analyzing problems surrounding negotiation, ratification, and implementation of international agreements when federations are signatories. The economic model isolates three factors (the variance of state net benefits under an agreement, individual states' opportunity costs associated with the agreement, and state-supported opportunism) as cost-increasing impediments to the successful institution of international economic agreements and highlights opportunism containment as fundamental to credible commitments in international agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Fred J. Ruppel & Fred O. Boadu & E. Wesley F. Peterson, 1991. "Federalism, Opportunism, and Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 73(4), pages 1009-1019.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:73:y:1991:i:4:p:1009-1019.

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Trofimov, Ivan D., 2017. "Political economy of trade protection and liberalization: in search of agency-based and holistic framework of policy change," MPRA Paper 79504, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:73:y:1991:i:4:p:1009-1019.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.