Plea Bargaining: A Challenging Issue In The Law And Economics

Plea bargaining is defined as an agreement between the prosecutor and defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a more lenient sentence. The literature on law and economics has been treating the plea bargaining as a desirable way of accomplishing the maximum prevention with minimum costs for criminal justice system. It is controversial issue for legal scholars who find the plea bargaining a “necessary evil”, demanding its reform or even abolishment. The main aim of the paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the plea bargaining, not only by discussing some of economic reasons affecting both parties when deciding to bargain, but also to provide more in-depth understanding of the wider context in which bargaining is taking place (powerful role of the state attorney, complex relationships between defendants and their attorneys-at-law, eff ects of bargains on third parties, desirable role of the court and the issue of innocence). Particular attention is given to the plea bargaining in the Republic of Croatia. Any further analysis must take into consideration that the key question of the plea bargaining is not only the interest of procedural economics and mitigated sentences, but also not to jeopardize the defendant rights, particularly not to open the possibility of wrongful conviction of innocent.