Rethinking Economics-Of-Crime Model Of Tax Compliance From Behavioral Perspective Applied To Romanian Case

Present paper tackles several research paradigms regarding tax compliance behavior that have been used to understand tax evasion phenomenon and tax avoidance behavior of the taxpayer. These notions have been studied by numerous researchers all over the world as phenomenon of tax evasion has a debating issue on every state agenda for several decades. First economic model of tax compliance behavior was developed in the early 1970s and since then researchers improved the model adding new elements from sociology, psychology, legal studies, finance, game theory, neurosciences, econophysics and others. This paper presents the most important developments of current theories regarding tax compliance behavior starting from the “economics-of-crime model” till the “slippery slope framework” and more. It creates the premises for a Romanian model of tax compliance behavior according to national characteristics regarding taxpayers attitude towards tax avoidance, risk appetite or aversion upon enforcement of law through punishment and penalty, taxpayers’ trust in authority’s efficient spending of tax collected revenue to public budget and personal beliefs regarding notions like morality, cheating, honesty, social responsibility, loyalty, patriotism, civic duty, guilt, fairness, reciprocity or financial incentives. Recent models of tax compliance behavior underline the importance of the dynamics between all the actors involved in the fiscal system such as government, tax authorities, tax consultants and accountants and the behavior of all other taxpayers as a whole. Current research trends believe that these are mutually related. Another important aspect regarding taxpayer’s attitude towards tax avoidance is its own motivation to voluntarily pay taxes driven by intrinsic beliefs or by fear of penalty coming from enforcement of laws. On the contrary, other taxpayers choose to assume an extra share of risk and decide to avoid taxes hiding in anonymity of masses. This paper intends to study the relevance of current models in tax compliance behavior applied to Romanian fiscal system.