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Predatory Foreclosure


  • OECD


Dominant firms can use various strategies to eliminate or deter competition, including unlawful price cuts or “predatory pricing”. That strategy involves a willingness to absorb losses in the near term that are rational only because they lead to greater profit in the longer term, after competitors have been disciplined or eliminated. Despite differences in statutes across jurisdictions, the roundtable discussion held in October 2004 in the Competition Committee quickly revealed a virtually unanimous view that the purpose of competition laws is to protect and promote competition, not competitors. With respect to methods for detecting predatory prices, including price-cost tests, there was a greater diversity of views because different cost measures are appropriate in different situations. There was broad agreement among Members that investigations should include an examination of whether an alleged predator would likely be able to recoup its predatory losses, with a negative finding indicative of a low probability of harm to competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Oecd, 2007. "Predatory Foreclosure," OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy, OECD Publishing, vol. 9(1), pages 81-167.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5l4fk7vstgvl

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