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The Effect of Board Reforms on CEO Compensation: Evidence from a Comparison between Public and Private Firms

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  • Kee-Hong Bae
  • Jisok Kang
  • Albert Tsang

Abstract

CEOs of public (listed) firms earn more than their counterparts in similar private (unlisted) firms. This can either be because rent extraction is easier in public firms than in private firms (rent extraction view), or because managing a public firm involves more legal and institutional responsibilities than managing an otherwise similar private firm (efficient contracting view). We show that corporate board reforms from 29 countries that strengthen board diligence, thus imposing more responsibilities on CEOs of public firms, result in a significant increase in the pay of CEOs of public firms relative to private firms. This result is consistent with the efficient contracting view of CEO compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Kee-Hong Bae & Jisok Kang & Albert Tsang, 2025. "The Effect of Board Reforms on CEO Compensation: Evidence from a Comparison between Public and Private Firms," Review of Corporate Finance, now publishers, vol. 5(1–2), pages 21-60, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jnlrcf:114.00000070
    DOI: 10.1561/114.00000070
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