IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Em busca de incentivos para atrair o trabalhador autônomo para a Previdência Social [Seeking incentives for self-employed people to join the Brazilian social security system]


  • Marcelo Neri


  • Samantha Dart Tamm


  • Flavio Menezes


  • Leandro Kume



This paper intends to show that economic incentives can affect the decisions of self-employed people whether to join or not the Brazilian social security system using a Principal-Agent framework. Relaxation of the rules for low income workers to access social security benefits promoted by the Federal Constitution of 1988 provides a laboratory to test such a model. The empirical analysis, however, contradicts the expectations of the theoretical model. There is a general movement of withdrawal from the social security system yet this movement is more pronounced at the richest self-employed group. In theoretical terms, this is explained by a violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. One possible explanation is that the increase in the availability of private pension funds in the market has created competition for the government system.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcelo Neri & Samantha Dart Tamm & Flavio Menezes & Leandro Kume, 2007. "Em busca de incentivos para atrair o trabalhador autônomo para a Previdência Social [Seeking incentives for self-employed people to join the Brazilian social security system]," Nova Economia, Economics Department, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Brazil), vol. 17(3), pages 363-394, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:nov:artigo:v:17:y:2007:i:3:p:363-394

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    social security; informality; self-employed; labor market;

    JEL classification:

    • J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nov:artigo:v:17:y:2007:i:3:p:363-394. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bárbara Freitas Paglioto). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.