Game-theoretic analysis of the global economic system with a dominant currency issuer

The article examines a global economic system in which a single country acts as the dominant issuer of the reserve currency. Employing game-theoretic modelling, it investigates the strategic interaction among the dominant issuer, independent states, and states allied with the issuer. The model reveals pronounced power asymmetries, incentives for excessive monetary issuance, and heightened risks of systemic instability. Equilibrium strategies are derived, and the conditions under which alliances may reconfigure are characterized. The analysis identifies the parameter ranges that sustain alternative equilibria within the international monetary regime and discusses the forces driving de-dollarization and possible transition to a multipolar currency order. The findings illuminate salient features of the contemporary global financial architecture, furnish theoretical rationales for policies that underpin globalization and single-currency domination, and expose the attendant systemic risks. The framework admits two equilibrium configurations, one of which is inherently unstable. Attaining this unstable equilibrium — possible only through the materialisation of major geopolitical shocks — could culminate in the collapse of the existing international monetary system.