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Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory

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  • R. Myerson

Abstract

John Nashs formulation of noncooperative game theory was one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science. Nashs work in this area is reviewed in its historical context to better understand how the fundamental ideas of noncooperative game theory have been developed and how they have changed the course of economic theory. It is shown in particular how the scope of economics has changed from production and allocation of material goods to the study of rational competitive behavior in any institution of society.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Myerson, 2010. "Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 6.
    • Handle: RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2010:id:1034
    DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2010-6-26-43
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. van Damme, Eric, 1995. "On the Contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(1), pages 3-11.
    2. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    3. Morgenstern, Oskar, 1976. "The Collaboration between Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann on the Theory of Games," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 805-816, September.
    4. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    5. van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J.W., 1995. "Equilibrium in strategic interaction : The contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten," Other publications TiSEM de9d99b7-7e74-4c92-90fc-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Robert J. Leonard, 1992. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash / or / The Emergence and Stabilization of the Nash equilibrium," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9214, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    7. Leonard, Robert J, 1994. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(424), pages 492-511, May.
    8. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    9. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, Decembrie.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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