IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nas/journl/v117y2020p11344-11349.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Indirect reciprocity with simple records

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Clark

    (Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139)

  • Drew Fudenberg

    (Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139)

  • Alexander Wolitzky

    (Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139)

Abstract

Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation. Existing models of indirect reciprocity fail to robustly support social cooperation: Image-scoring models fail to provide robust incentives, while social-standing models are not informationally robust. Here we provide a model of indirect reciprocity based on simple, decentralized records: Each individual’s record depends on the individual’s own past behavior alone, and not on the individual’s partners’ past behavior or their partners’ partners’ past behavior. When social dilemmas exhibit a coordination motive (or strategic complementarity), tolerant trigger strategies based on simple records can robustly support positive social cooperation and exhibit strong stability properties. In the opposite case of strategic substitutability, positive social cooperation cannot be robustly supported. Thus, the strength of short-run coordination motives in social dilemmas determines the prospects for robust long-run cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020. "Indirect reciprocity with simple records," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 117(21), pages 11344-11349, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:117:y:2020:p:11344-11349
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.pnas.org/content/117/21/11344.full
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Meike Will & Jürgen Groeneveld & Karin Frank & Birgit Müller, 2021. "Informal risk-sharing between smallholders may be threatened by formal insurance: Lessons from a stylized agent-based model," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(3), pages 1-18, March.
    2. Raja R Timilsina & Yutaka Kobayashi & Koji Kotani, 2022. "Non-kinship successors for resource sustainability," Working Papers SDES-2022-2, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jan 2022.
    3. Isamu Okada, 2020. "A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-17, July.
    4. Quan, Ji & Nie, Jiacheng & Chen, Wenman & Wang, Xianjia, 2022. "Keeping or reversing social norms promote cooperation by enhancing indirect reciprocity," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    5. Gao, Meng & Li, Zhi & Wu, Te, 2023. "Evolutionary dynamics of friendship-driven reputation strategies," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 175(P1).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:117:y:2020:p:11344-11349. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Eric Cain (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.pnas.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.