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Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments

Author

Listed:
  • Xuelong Li

    (Xi’an Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Xi’an 710119, Shaanxi, China)

  • Marko Jusup

    (Center of Mathematics for Social Creativity, Research Institute for Electronic Science, Hokkaido University, Sapporo 060-0812, Japan)

  • Zhen Wang

    (Center for Optical Imagery Analysis and Learning, School of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, Shaanxi, China)

  • Huijia Li

    (School of Management Science and Engineering, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100080, China)

  • Lei Shi

    (Statistics and Mathematics College, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China)

  • Boris Podobnik

    (Center for Polymer Studies, Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215; Faculty of Civil Engineering, University of Rijeka, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia; Zagreb School of Economics and Management, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia; Luxembourg School of Business, 2453 Luxembourg, Luxembourg; Faculty of Information Studies, SI-8000 Novo Mesto, Slovenia)

  • H. Eugene Stanley

    (Center for Polymer Studies, Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215)

  • Shlomo Havlin

    (Department of Physics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900 Ramat-Gan, Israel; Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan)

  • Stefano Boccaletti

    (Institute for Complex Systems of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 50019 Florence, Italy; The Italian Embassy in Israel, 68125 Tel Aviv, Israel)

Abstract

Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism—costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Xuelong Li & Marko Jusup & Zhen Wang & Huijia Li & Lei Shi & Boris Podobnik & H. Eugene Stanley & Shlomo Havlin & Stefano Boccaletti, 2018. "Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 115(1), pages 30-35, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:115:y:2018:p:30-35
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