The Effects Of a Patent System on Product Varieties in Hotelling's Competition
The effects of a patent system on the chosen strategies of duopolists in an Hotelling's line game are examined. It is found that even a patent which is not designed to reward inventors with monopoly power will increase the range of costs to R&D from which a monopoly will result. Wider patents will increase the range of costs which give rise to a patent race as the unique equilibrium.
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