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I sussidi al trasporto pubblico locale. Esperienze di regolamentazione a confronto

Listed author(s):
  • Buzzo Margari Beniamina
  • Piacenza Massimiliano

Since the mid nineties the Italian Local Public Transport (Lpt) sector has been involved in a structural reform process, with the aim of increasing both productive efficiency and service effectiveness. To meet this purpose, the new regulatory framework shifts the financial responsibility from central to local level and introduces new mechanisms for allotting the service (competitive tendering) and granting subsidies (incentive contracts), consistently with the prediction of the "new theory of regulation " of monopolies (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). As for the latter issue, it is worthwhile to underline that the presence of asymmetric information in Lpt (adverse selection and moral hazard) implies serious difficulties in controlling operating costs by Local Authorities, that have to define reimbursement and risk sharing schemes. The present study compares three cases in Italy - Bolzano, Bologna and Torino - characterised by different regulation developments, to assess the impact of the adopted subsidization schemes on the productive performance of Lpt operators. In particular, by analysing the legislative changes occurred within each context, it points to the implications in terms of efficiency and service effectiveness of different solutions, highlighting strength points and critical issues. Furthermore, cueing from some successful factors of regulation mechanisms adopted in other regions and countries, the paper discusses possible improvements.Uno degli scopi fondamentali della riforma che da alcuni anni sta interessando il settore del trasporto pubblico locale (TPL) in Italia è quello di indirizzare gli operatori verso recuperi sostanziali di efficienza produttiva e di efficacia del servizio. Tale obiettivo è perseguibile, da un lato, decentrando le responsabilità finanziarie a livello locale e, dall'altro, agendo sui meccanismi che regolano l'accesso al mercato (gare per l'affidamento del servizio) e l'assegnazione dei sussidi (contratti incentivanti), in linea con le previsioni della "nuova teoria della regolamentazione" dei monopoli (Laffont e Tirole, 1993). Con riferimento a quest'ultimo aspetto, va sottolineato che nel TPL la presenza di asimmetrie informative ("adverse selection" e "moral hazard") rende problematico il controllo dei costi operativi da parte dell'Autorità Locale, a cui compete la definizione delle modalità di erogazione dei sussidi. Il presente studio esamina in un'ottica comparata tre esperienze - Bolzano, Bologna e Torino - caratterizzate da una diversa evoluzione della cornice regolatoria, cercando di valutare l'impatto degli schemi di sussidio adottati sulla performance produttiva degli operatori. In particolare, attraverso un esame degli sviluppi normativi all'interno di ciascuna realtà, si evidenziano le ricadute in termini di efficienza ed efficacia del servizio delle diverse soluzioni, sottolineandone gli aspetti positivi e i punti critici. Traendo poi spunto da alcuni fattori di successo dei meccanismi di regolamentazione utilizzati in altri contesti, regionali e internazionali, vengono inoltre discusse possibili formule migliorative.

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Article provided by Società editrice il Mulino in its journal Mercato Concorrenza Regole.

Volume (Year): (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 581-616

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Handle: RePEc:mul:jhpfyn:doi:10.1434/23367:y:2006:i:3:p:581-616
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