IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article



  • Tommasi Rollo


Fees imposed by the Italian Antitrust Authority, although they were increased under the Tesauro chairmanship, still appear to be inadequate for deterring anti-competitive behaviour. Furthermore, the approach followed by the European Commission, which seems to be imitated by the Italian Authority, is flawed on two main counts. First, the European Commission has established a system of fixed basic amounts of sanctions so that they cannot be related to the turnover of the markets affected by anticompetitive conduct. This is at odds with well established economic principles. Secondly, the increase in fines for long-term infringements is very low and lacks any deterring effect. The final part of the article urges Italian Authorities to adopt leniency programs and change the legislation to make it possible to fine the firms which collude through an association (under the present law, only the association can be fined).

Suggested Citation

  • Tommasi Rollo, 2005. "8-11-118," Mercato Concorrenza Regole, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 483-502.
  • Handle: RePEc:mul:jhpfyn:doi:10.1434/21140:y:2005:i:3:p:483-502

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mul:jhpfyn:doi:10.1434/21140:y:2005:i:3:p:483-502. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.