IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Struttura organizzativa e allocazione del potere decisionale

  • De Paola Maria

The aim of this paper is to examine the factors influencing the allocation of decisional power inside the firm. While decisional rights are conferred directly through the ownership of assets, the owners often choose to delegate some decisional power to other subjects inside the organization, such as managers, workers etc. In relation to this choice different organizational structures emerge, characterized by different degrees of workers' autonomy. In this paper the firms' tendency, observed in the last decades, to favor decentralization is examined through a review of the economic literature that interprets the organizational form in relation to the allocation of decisional rights. We distinguish between two main approaches. The first, abstracting from incentive problems, focuses on co-ordination problems taking into account the costs of acquisition, processing and communication of information, the delays and errors in decisionmaking, the advantages from specialization etc. The second, based on the hypothesis that the principal and the agent have divergent objectives, analyses benefits and costs of delegating the decisional power to agents in relation to the influence that this choice produces on incentives, on the use of information and on expropriation costs.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.rivisteweb.it/download/article/10.1428/18765
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1428/18765
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Società editrice il Mulino in its journal Economia politica.

Volume (Year): (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 471-510

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:mul:jb33yl:doi:10.1428/18765:y:2004:i:3:p:471-510
Contact details of provider:

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mul:jb33yl:doi:10.1428/18765:y:2004:i:3:p:471-510. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.