IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Dalla teoria dei beni pubblici locali al federalismo funzionale


  • Vincenzo Rebba


This paper illustrates some of the main results within local public finance, focusing on the relationships between local public goods (LPGs), club goods and fiscal federalism theories. The paper also considers competitive federalism and functional federalism, two models recently proposed in order to overcome the limits of traditional theories on LPGs and fiscal federalism. The analysis especially concentrates on functional federalism. Initially, section 2 gives a broad definition of local public goods (LPGs), pointing out the analogy between this category of collective goods and club goods. Section 3 analyzes the main contents of competitive models of LPGs supply developed by Tiebout, Buchanan and Berglas. Section 4 underlines the limits of these models and shows how many factors give rise to a LPGs market characterized by a restricted number of local jurisdictions. In section 5, after illustrating the fiscal equivalence principle, the fundamentals and the conceptual limits of traditional normative theory of fiscal federalism are exposed; moreover, it is shown how a model of competitive federalism could overcome the drawbacks of traditional normative approach, by resorting to some properties of the competitive models of LPGs allocation. Section 6 analyzes the theoretical foundations and some examples of the model of functional federalism; given the existing framework of local governments, functional federalism can minimize the shifting from the fiscal equivalence principle, being based on the formation - through cooperative agreements between individuals or local communities - of a system of single or multi-function jurisdictions each corresponding to a optimally sized club providing a LPG or a set of LPGs. Finally, section 7 suggests some directions for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincenzo Rebba, 1998. "Dalla teoria dei beni pubblici locali al federalismo funzionale," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 333-398.
  • Handle: RePEc:mul:jb33yl:doi:10.1428/1874:y:1998:i:2:p:333-398

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Leonzio Rizzo, 2006. "Le inefficienze della competizione fiscale: una rassegna dei principali modelli teorici," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 89-120.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mul:jb33yl:doi:10.1428/1874:y:1998:i:2:p:333-398. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.