IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mul/jb33yl/doi10.1428-1848y1997i2p283-344.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Giochi e giustizia: l'approccio strategico alle procedure extragiudiziali

Author

Listed:
  • Bernardo Bortolotti

Abstract

Traditionally, the economist defines the objectives of regulation, and the legal scholar designs the more appropriate procedures to implement it. This paper is intended to question this view, showing that economic theory - particularly game theory and information economics - could represent a valuable tool for understanding how the enforcement of laws is administrated. In this direction, the paper provides a critical survey of the achievements of a recent field of law and economics, namely the economic analysis of extrajudicial procedures. The findings of this literature show that modelling civil and criminal suits as games under incomplete information provides an interesting theory of pretrial negotiations and plea bargains and some normative predictions about the welfare effects of the negotiated enforcement of laws.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernardo Bortolotti, 1997. "Giochi e giustizia: l'approccio strategico alle procedure extragiudiziali," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 283-344.
  • Handle: RePEc:mul:jb33yl:doi:10.1428/1848:y:1997:i:2:p:283-344
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.rivisteweb.it/download/article/10.1428/1848
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1428/1848
    Download Restriction: no

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mul:jb33yl:doi:10.1428/1848:y:1997:i:2:p:283-344. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: https://www.rivisteweb.it/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.