Giochi e giustizia: l'approccio strategico alle procedure extragiudiziali
Traditionally, the economist defines the objectives of regulation, and the legal scholar designs the more appropriate procedures to implement it. This paper is intended to question this view, showing that economic theory - particularly game theory and information economics - could represent a valuable tool for understanding how the enforcement of laws is administrated. In this direction, the paper provides a critical survey of the achievements of a recent field of law and economics, namely the economic analysis of extrajudicial procedures. The findings of this literature show that modelling civil and criminal suits as games under incomplete information provides an interesting theory of pretrial negotiations and plea bargains and some normative predictions about the welfare effects of the negotiated enforcement of laws.
Volume (Year): (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mul:jb33yl:doi:10.1428/1848:y:1997:i:2:p:283-344. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.